Total
3 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-1633 | 1 Renesas | 10 Arm-trusted-firmware, R-car D3e, R-car E3e and 7 more | 2025-01-24 | N/A | 2.0 LOW |
| During the secure boot, bl2 (the second stage of the bootloader) loops over images defined in the table “bl2_mem_params_descs”. For each image, the bl2 reads the image length and destination from the image’s certificate. Because of the way of reading from the image, which base on 32-bit unsigned integer value, it can result to an integer overflow. An attacker can bypass memory range restriction and write data out of buffer bounds, which could result in bypass of secure boot. Affected git version from c2f286820471ed276c57e603762bd831873e5a17 until (not | |||||
| CVE-2024-6564 | 1 Renesas | 1 Arm-trusted-firmware | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 6.7 MEDIUM |
| Buffer overflow in "rcar_dev_init" due to using due to using untrusted data (rcar_image_number) as a loop counter before verifying it against RCAR_MAX_BL3X_IMAGE. This could lead to a full bypass of secure boot. | |||||
| CVE-2024-6563 | 1 Renesas | 1 Arm-trusted-firmware | 2024-11-21 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') vulnerability in Renesas arm-trusted-firmware allows Local Execution of Code. This vulnerability is associated with program files https://github.Com/renesas-rcar/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/rcar_gen3_v2.5/drivers/renesas/common/io/i... https://github.Com/renesas-rcar/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/rcar_gen3_v2.5/drivers/renesas/common/io/io_rcar.C . In line 313 "addr_loaded_cnt" is checked not to be "CHECK_IMAGE_AREA_CNT" (5) or larger, this check does not halt the function. Immediately after (line 317) there will be an overflow in the buffer and the value of "dst" will be written to the area immediately after the buffer, which is "addr_loaded_cnt". This will allow an attacker to freely control the value of "addr_loaded_cnt" and thus control the destination of the write immediately after (line 318). The write in line 318 will then be fully controlled by said attacker, with whichever address and whichever value ("len") they desire. | |||||