CVE-2025-22030

{"id": "CVE-2025-22030", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "cvssData": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 5.5, "attackVector": "LOCAL", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 3.6, "exploitabilityScore": 1.8}]}, "published": "2025-04-16T15:15:55.607", "references": [{"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/717d9c35deff6c33235693171bacbb03e9643fa4", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/747e3eec1d7d124ea90ed3d7b85369df8b4e36d2", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8d18000e9d2d97aaf105f5f9b3b0e8a6fbf8b96", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628", "tags": ["Patch"], "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}], "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-667"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead()\n\nCurrently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding\nthe per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock\n(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).\n\nOn the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through\ncrypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation\nresults in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.\n\nThe above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the\nfollowing scenario:\n\n(1) Task A running on CPU #1:\n crypto_alloc_acomp_node()\n Holds scomp_lock\n Enters reclaim\n Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)\n\n(2) Task A is descheduled\n\n(3) CPU #1 goes offline\n zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)\n Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))\n Calls crypto_free_acomp()\n Waits for scomp_lock\n\n(4) Task A running on CPU #2:\n Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1\n DEADLOCK\n\nSince there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU\nacomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is\nunlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for\nconsistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the\nfuture.\n\nWith this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex\nheld. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes\nacomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations\nbefore holding the mutex.\n\nOpportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place\nbefore the mutex dereference."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mm: zswap: correcci\u00f3n del bloqueo de crypto_free_acomp() en zswap_cpu_comp_dead(). Actualmente, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() llama a crypto_free_acomp() mientras mantiene el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU. A continuaci\u00f3n, crypto_free_acomp() mantiene scomp_lock (mediante crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). Por otro lado, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() mantiene scomp_lock (mediante crypto_scomp_init_tfm()) y luego asigna memoria. Si la asignaci\u00f3n resulta en una recuperaci\u00f3n, podemos intentar mantener el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU. Las dependencias anteriores pueden causar un bloqueo de ABBA. Por ejemplo, en el siguiente escenario: (1) Tarea A ejecut\u00e1ndose en la CPU n.\u00ba 1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Retiene scomp_lock Ingresa a recuperaci\u00f3n Lee per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) La tarea A se desprograma (3) La CPU n.\u00ba 1 se desconecta zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU n.\u00ba 1) Retiene per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Llama a crypto_free_acomp() Espera a scomp_lock (4) Tarea A ejecut\u00e1ndose en la CPU n.\u00ba 2: Espera a per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Lee en la CPU n.\u00ba 1 BLOQUEO INTERMEDIO Dado que no es necesario llamar a crypto_free_acomp() con el mutex acomp_ctx por CPU retenido en zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), mu\u00e9valo despu\u00e9s de que se desbloquee el mutex. Tambi\u00e9n se desplazan las llamadas acomp_request_free() y kfree() para mantener la coherencia y evitar posibles dependencias de bloqueo sutil en el futuro. Con esto, solo se establece el valor NULL de los campos acomp_ctx con el mutex retenido. Esto es similar a c\u00f3mo zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() solo inicializa los campos acomp_ctx con el mutex retenido, despu\u00e9s de realizar todas las asignaciones antes de retener el mutex. Oportunistamente, se desplaza la comprobaci\u00f3n de valores NULL en acomp_ctx para que se realice antes de la desreferencia del mutex."}], "lastModified": "2025-10-28T19:05:41.203", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "C007FC9C-EF72-4E8D-B8AF-1F5CEBB036E0", "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.23", "versionStartIncluding": "6.12.12"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "A1ED3A9A-88AD-47D5-B428-93C7630E46F8", "versionEndExcluding": "6.13.11", "versionStartIncluding": "6.13.1"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "FADAE5D8-4808-442C-B218-77B2CE8780A0", "versionEndExcluding": "6.14.2", "versionStartIncluding": "6.14"}, {"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "5A3F9505-6B98-4269-8B81-127E55A1BF00"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}